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influence in China youll certainly be turned by Japan to
full account not only in war, but in preparation for war,
and our security would thereby be seriously prejudiced.
23. It would appear to be just as much to the interests
of the Portuguese as to ourselves to prevent the Japanese
from obtaining control of Macao, and as the Portuguese
Government are understood to be financially in an excellent
position there would appear prima facie to be no reason why
they should not afford such assistance as the Governor of
Macao esires. The point should not be overlooked, however,
that if Portuguese assistance vore not forthcoming it might
in the long run pay us to give help because any such outlay
might more than make up for the loss which would undoubtedly
ensuo from any Japanese commercial operations in this area.
Recomendation.
94. It has been pointed out at the beginning of this
Report that it was found impossible to separate the strategic,
political and economic considerations of the Japanese attempts
to obtain concessions in Macao. We hesitate to put forward
recommendations having a political bearing, but as a result
of our consultations with Mr. Orde and Sir John Maffey we
would submit for consideration that in the first instance
His Majesty's Government might review the possibility of an
approach to the Portuguese Government, with a view to that
Government itself taking steps to prevent the intrusion of
Japanese interests in the Macao concession. Any subsequent
action which might be desirable or possible would appear to
depend on the results of such approaches.
(sa.) ERNLE CHATFIELD.
E.L.ELLINGTON.
J.G.DILL.
Maj: Gen: (for C.I.G.S.)
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.
25th March, 1935.
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